



While drones did not introduce targeted assassinations, 9/11
and new technologies have pushed the boundaries of the
tactic’s acceptability.
Despite its rejection by the Ford administration in the 1970s, the tactic of state-led assassination
has been resurgent since 9/11, and has found its latest expression in the use of unmanned drone
strikes. Andris Banka writes that innovative drone technologies have refashioned the centuries
old tactic of targeted assassination in previously unimaginable ways by making the risks minimal
and success rates high. He argues that while 9/11 created the opportunity for lawmakers to push
again for targeted assassinations, drone technology itself has helped to expand the boundaries of
what the public considers to be acceptable.
State-led assassinations are not a novelty in international affairs; they have been with us from medieval to
modern times. What is significantly different today however is the systematic basis in which assassination is
delivered from above the clouds via Predator drones. As a method targeted killing was supposed to be left on a
dusty shelf, and revisited only during dire security crises when other means of changing the course of events
have been fully exhausted. Instead, compiling kill-lists and striking specific individuals has evolved into a routine
monthly event – a trademark US policy praised by the political elites and accepted by the American people.
Historically, the idea that assassination should not be part of America’s tool-box emerged in the 1970s with the so
called Church Committee. After Congressional investigation had shed light on numerous CIA initiated plots
against foreign heads of states, like Fidel Castro and Congolese Patrice Lumumba, the US government for the
first time publically and principally drew a red line with respect to assassination as a method of foreign affairs.
The key conclusion reached by the committee was that targeting specific individuals was morally disgraceful,
practically unreliable and simply irreconcilable with America’s democratic character. As a result President Gerald
Ford issued executive order stating that: ‘No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or
conspire to engage in, political assassination’.
Every once in a while temptation to roll the dice with targeted killings resurfaced in Washington’s corridors of
power. During the presidencies of Reagan, Bush, and Clinton transnational terrorism and rogue state dictators, or
at times the combination of both, profoundly tested previously set normative boundaries. In its modern shape
terrorist activities generated tensions between domestic norms, which were there to restrict certain actions, and
global realities, which increasingly demanded swift and flexible measures to protect the American people.
Presidents and their advisors grappled with the sensitive issue of assassination, and at times wanted to follow
slogan of ‘an eye for an eye’.
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While two cases in particular speak to the fact that America tried to solve some of its problems through targeted
killing – Reagan bombed Colonel Gaddafi’s tent and Clinton sent cruise missiles to kill Bin Laden – on the whole
these episodes represented rare exceptions. Targeted assassination was treated as a last resort temporal
measure, and lawmakers were highly cautious of not setting it on a permanent footing. Lessons from the 1970s
had left a bad aftertaste, and occupants of the White House believed that US foreign policy can be successfully
steered without having to systematically engage in the dark business of covert killings. Before September 11,
2001 only one country – Israel, regularly utilized targeted assassinations and was harshly criticized for that by
America.
The conviction that ‘nailing the bad guys’ is something off-limits disappeared almost overnight on 9/11. Methods
that were previously listed as too radical and ill-advised were now given a second look. Targeted killings
seemingly promised the best insurance policy against future terrorist attacks. Secretive order signed by President
George Bush, just days after September 11, eliminated previous normative and legal barriers, and as a result the
United States embarked on a massive man-hunting operation across the globe. In the wake of the security crises
government untied its own hands, and re-introduced lethal authority to go after specific individuals, in many ways
resembling the pre-Church committee era times.
Even if the United States had not developed armed drone capabilities, it is likely that targeted killings would still
have been an integral part of the ‘war on terror’. Drones did not introduce targeted assassinations. Diverse tools
ranging from poison to hammer, car bombs and even lamp stands have been used for such operations. That
being said, advancement of cutting-edge UAV technology greatly influenced how policy makers thought about
this policy option, and clearly increased quantity of such missions.
In order to fully grasp the importance of drones it is useful to remember that the United States historically had
considerable practical difficulties executing assassination plans. At the end of the day, no matter how carefully
designed, government initiated plots against Castro, Gaddafi, Bin Laden and others, all had failed. With the
introduction of drones this was no longer the case. Armed Predators markedly increased the success rate of such
operations. Suddenly killing unwanted foreign persons became easy, impersonal and seemingly clean. For the
attacking side the risks were minimal and the body count of those killed high.
Absent of 9/11 targeted assassinations would have not become a permanent feature of US foreign policy. One
however should not oversimplify the processes that lead to such profound policy shift. While terrorist attacks
created a window of opportunity for lawmakers to change existing practices, new technological developments
also played an important role in pushing the borderline of what is seen as ‘acceptable’ much further away.
The issue here is not only of normative importance. Each drone strike promotes a new code of conduct – that
killing targets based on secretive memos and fuzzy threat perceptions is justifiable. Each strike not only kills
someone, but also invites reciprocal action. Long gone are the days when the United States could claim a
monopoly over this technology. Having droned for almost a decade without any restrictions or visible
consequences, United States might one day realize that the same advancements and methods that allowed it to
look so invincible are successfully being copied by others, and has in turn made it vulnerable.
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